We show how to establish cryptographic keys in sensor networks where neither PKI nor a trusted third party exists. We use a "web-of-trust" model, establishing "path" keys using pairwise trust relationships between intermediaries sharing preloaded keys. We first show how to defeat current schemes with key foisting, a devastating novel attack not described in the literature. Foisting compromises 90% of the path keys, when only 10% of the sensors in the network are seized. We then present a two-way path-key establishment scheme, and a highest random weight based path-key establishment scheme to deal with key foisting, using mGKE as an illustrative example. Our schemes reduce the probability of successful key foisting to nearly zero even when 20% sensors are seized. Its overhead is affordable, and its resilience is excellent. We also discuss key foisting in general distributed systems.
INTRODUCTION
Sensors are widely deployed in traffic control, supplychain management, theft prevention, patient monitoring, personal security, driver's licenses, passports, and so on. They are now present in nearly every device we encounter in our daily life. Sensors systems are evolving from networks of special-purpose devices deployed on demand, to becoming ubiquitous in our environment.
This trend is exemplified by the Internet of Things (IoT), a universal network of devices. The IoT is seen [2, 24] as a self-configuring global network infrastructure based on interoperable protocols, comprising physical and virtual nodes with identities, attributes, and intelligent interfaces, seamlessly integrated into a network. Its nodes will participate in business, information and . social processes, interacting with themselves and the environment, and influencing the real world through actions, with or without human intervention.
Heterogeneity Complicates Security
Security is a big concern in such networks, but heterogeneity complicates the establishment of cryptographic keys. In large sensor networks, including IoT, sensors will have widely different configurations and hardware and software capabilities. They will also belong to different administrative domains, each with its own policies and protocols. Heterogeneity means that no single set of policies or protocols will work for all sensors.
Public-Key Infrastructures (PKIs) [1] can be an effective solution, but not all nodes in such a network may support public key protocols, or even subscribe to PKIs. For similar reasons, it is unlikely that any single third party will be sufficiently trusted to mediate symmetric pairwise key establishment between all nodes.
Sensor Groups and Webs of Trust
We note that it is natural to organize such large networks as groups, mirroring their structural, communication and trust relationships in the real world. Nodes in each organizational unit (floor, building, factory, vehicle, etc.) form a natural group for administrative purposes. Nodes in one group are more likely to communicate more with each other, and trust each other more than they might trust nodes from a different unit.
The last point is especially important, when neither PKI nor a globally trusted authority is available. Under these constraints, we are forced to exploit the trust relationships between nodes that naturally arise in a group-based organization. Such trust can be formalized as shared keys within and across groups at configuration time. This serves as the foundation for the subsequent dynamic establishment of trust (keys) between nodes.
A similar "web of trust" model is seen in PGP [22] , and widely used for decentralized public-key discovery. Users maintain validated user-public key associations in the form of personal "key rings". if user Alice needs Carol's public key, and Bob is able to forward a key he can cryptographically certify as Carol's, Alice can accept this key if she trusts Bob. When Alice only has partial trust in a set of users, she can accept a key if it is certified by a threshold number of users.
Assumptions and Threats
Our work does not use public keys, but does use pair-wise trust relationships. We will first present key foisting, a new attack that easily compromises web-oftrust models, whether they use public keys or symmetric keys. We will then describe a two-way key establishment protocol that addresses this attack.
We will show how to establish dynamic symmetric pairwise cryptographic keys in the scenario where trusted authorities or PKI may be available to some nodes, but not to all. Mutual trust must now be realized through pairwise shared symmetric keys between sensors. However, sensors lack enough memory to store all O(n) pairwise keys for all other sensors in the system. Communication patterns are unknown in advance, so not all pairs of communicating sensors can share preloaded keys.
We will assume that we are dealing with wireless sensor networks (WSNs), since they are inherently insecure [6, 7, 9, 14, 19, 20] . However, our work applies equally to wired sensor networks. In Sec .9, we also discuss pairwise key establishment in general distributed networks.
Sensor Groups, Associations, and Agents
Current group-based schemes [4, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19] try to establish shared keys without trusted third parties or PKI, but we will see that they have serious flaws. Typically, a WSN with n nodes is organized into g groups with γ nodes each [19] . Each node pair within a group U is preloaded with a unique key. In Fig. 1a , each of {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 } holds a key for its neighbors in U . Also, t > 1 node pairs across each group pair (U, V ) share preloaded keys. (a 4 , b 3 ), (a 2 , b 1 ) are such pairs in Fig. 1a . Fig. 2 shows a 3-level group hierarchy. For a 2-level hierarchy with t agents across each group pair, each node holds only γ − 1 preloaded intra-group keys, and t(g − 1)/γ inter-group keys [19] .
Sensor pairs, such as (a 1 , a 2 ) and (a 4 , b 3 ) in Fig. 1a , that share preloaded keys are called associated . A sensor s i ∈ U sharing a key with a sensor s j ∈ V is an agent in U for V . Sensors not associated will establish path keys using agents as intermediaries. Fig. 1b shows typical path-key establishment in current schemes. a 3 establishes a path key with b 2 , by forwarding it via agents a 4 and b 3 . Hops ⟨a 3 , a 4 ⟩, ⟨a 4 , b 3 ⟩, and ⟨b 3 , b 2 ⟩ forward encrypted messages, possibly over multiple radio hops. Decryption and re-encryption occurs at a 4 and b 3 .
Preloaded keys are resilient, since they are compromised only when one of their owners is. However, compromising an intermediary compromises a path key.
General Distributed System
In mGKE, it is guaranteed that there are at most three cryptographic hops between two nodes not associated (Fig. 1a) , and cryptographic paths between them are pre-defined. However, in a general distributed system, cryptographic paths between two nodes may not be pre-defined. There can be arbitrary number of cryptographic paths between two nodes, and each path can contain arbitrary number of cryptographic hops.
Key Stealing and Foisting Attacks
By seizing a sensor, the adversary gains both its preloaded keys, as well as all path keys it mediates. Current schemes [4, 5, 17, 19] recognize such attacks, which we call key stealing (KS). As in Fig. 3 , KS permits eavesdropping and false data injection. Typically, KS allows the adversary to compromise 30% of the path keys by seizing about 10% of its sensors [17, 19] .
In this paper, we introduce key foisting (KF), a novel attack which can compromise 90% of the path keys by seizing only 10% of the sensors. KF is devastating because end-to-end authentication is impossible during path-key establishment. Since there is no trusted third party, path key establishment must rely on on trusted intermediaries, who can only authenticate on a hop-byhop basis. End-to-end authentication requires end-toend keys, but the very purpose of path-key establishment is to set up such keys between the end points.
In key foisting, the adversary uses seized intermediaries to send fabricated path key establishment messages to fool other sensors to accept path keys generated by him. Such attacks are devastating and hard to detect. In current schemes, such as mGKE [19] , PIKE [4] , GP [17] , only about 1% of the communication channels are secured via preloaded keys. The rest are secured by path keys. The adversary can compromise 90% of path keys by seizing a mere 10% of sensors. In effect, no content transmitted in the network is secure.
Our Contributions
We propose a new two-way path-key establishment scheme to address KF. This scheme allows recipients to verify the correctness of path keys, while in earlier schemes, recipients have no choice but to assume that the path keys are correct. We apply the twoway scheme in mGKE and the results show that the resilience against KF is greatly improved. We also propose a highest random weight (HRW) based path key establishment scheme. The resilience of our HRW based scheme is comparable to our two-way scheme while its communication overhead is much smaller.
We make the following contributions:
• We describe key foisting, and show that it is devastating against schemes such as [4, 17, 19] .
• We present a novel two-way (2W) scheme that defeats key foisting attacks. This scheme is compatible with a variety of key management schemes.
• We present an HRW based scheme to deal with key foisting, with less communication overhead than the 2W scheme.
• We apply our 2W scheme and HRW based scheme to mGKE [19] as an example, and present a rigorous analysis of resilience. Similar analysis is possible for other schemes.
• We show how to perform key foisting in general distributed networks. Our 2W scheme and HRW based scheme can also be used to deal with key foisting in the general model.
Group-based key management schemes have the following advantages. First, sensors in the same group are more likely to communicate with each other. By giving sensors in the same group preloaded pairwise keys, we increase resilience to attacks and reduce overhead, since path keys between neighbors now requires local communication, unlike [5, 12] . Second, the two-way scheme can be combined with multipath reinforcement to resist hybrid attacks KF-KS (Section 7.1). Unlike [12] and [5] , it is easy to find multiple disjoint key establishment paths between any two sensors in group-based schemes.
In this paper, related work appears in Sec. 2, and Sec. 3 presents an overview of key distribution, path key establishment, KS and KF attacks. Sec. 4 presents our two-way scheme and its use in mGKE. Sec. 5 presents our HRW based path key establishment scheme. Sec. 6 analyzes one-and two-way path key schemes. Sec. 7 analyzes replay attacks and hybrid KF-KS attacks against our two-way scheme. Sec. 8 analyzes the resilience of HRW based key establishment scheme against attacks. Sec. 9 analyzes key foisting in the general model. Sec. 10 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
Group-based key management [4, 19, 17] operates in three phases. In the predistribution phase, selected sensors pairs are assigned shared keys before deployment. In the key-setup phase, sensors are deployed, and discover neighbors and associations. In the path-key establishment phase, unassociated sensors establish path keys as needed, using agents.
In [12] , each sensor s i randomly selects an m-subset S i of a key pool K. Sensors s i , s j can use any key from S i ∩ S j as their shared key. If S i ∩ S j = ∅, they can establish path keys via intermediaries. In the qcomposition scheme [5] , two sensors may set up a key if they share at least q preloaded keys. [5] generates an ID pool and a pairwise key pool for IDs. A sensor randomly selects an ID from the ID pool, and is preloaded with a key matching its ID from the key pool.
Threshold-based key predistribution is proposed in [11] and [16] . Blom's key space scheme [3] is improved in [11] using multiple key spaces. The polynomial-based key-predistribution scheme is expanded in [16] using a polynomial pool instead of a single polynomial. This scheme uses a logical grid in which all sensors on a row or columns share a key. Sensors on different rows or columns establish path keys via agents. Another gridbased scheme appears in [4] . GP [17] uses a grid, placing sensors on each row or column into the same group. Among the schemes for intra-group key predistribution, using unique pairwise keys achieves the best resilience.
In the scheme of [19] , sensors in the same group share preloaded pairwise keys, and path keys established via agents are very robust. Intra-group keys have perfect resilience against key stealing. KeEs [7] guarantees backward and forward key security for key compromise attacks, but fails catastrophically for node compromises.
The potential of multipath reinforcement [5] is not realized by current schemes. They require disjoint cryptographic paths to be found on-demand, an expensive task. A cryptographic path may include many agents in [5] , multiplying the chances of compromise. [15] guarantees paths with at most one agent, but requires flooding, which is too expensive. Fault localization is the focus in [25] . Other schemes [6, 20] try to mitigate the impact of false data injection attacks on in-network aggregation.
ATTACK MODEL
We illustrate key predistribution and path key establishment using mGKE [19] as an example. mGKE divides a sensor network into groups. All sensor pairs within each group share pairwise keys (i.e., are associated). For any two groups G 1 , G 2 , mGKE guarantees that at least one s i ∈ G 1 and s j ∈ G 2 share preloaded keys. Such sensors in different groups but sharing preloaded keys are called agents. Fig. 1a shows two groups, each containing four sensors. Real sensor networks may have hundreds of groups. All sensors within each group share preloaded pairwise keys. In Fig. 1a, (a 2 , b 1 ) and (a 4 , b 3 ) are the agent pairs between these groups.
In Fig. 1b, sensors a 3 and b 2 establish a path key via agents a 4 and b 3 . Let K a3b2 be the key between nodes a 3 and b 2 , and ⟨M ∥K aibi ⟩ denote the message M encrypted with K aibi . To establish a path key with b 2 , sensor a 3 picks a random value K a3b2 , and proceeds as follows (headers omitted for simplicity).
, encrypted by a 3 , may be relayed by several nodes before a 4 receives and decrypts it. Thus, ⟨a 3 , a 4 ⟩, ⟨a 4 , b 3 ⟩, ⟨b 3 , b 2 ⟩ are not radio hops, but "cryptographic" hops between "active" encryption and decryption sites. A series of cryptographically active nodes mediating path keys, such as a 3 , a 4 , b 3 , b 2 in Fig. 1b , is a keypath. The path key K a3b2 is known to the end points a 3 , b 2 , but also to the agents a 4 , b 3 that mediate the key. The adversary can get the key by seizing a 4 or b 3 .
We assume the Yao-Dolev model [8, 14] . The adversary may record all traffic, but wishes to remain undetected. Preloaded keys have perfect resilience [19] , so we focus on threats to path keys. Cryptanalysis yields individual keys, but can be mitigated, as in [7] . We assume node seizures, a greater threat. Seizure yields all keys in a node, including path keys it mediates, and permits insider attacks [14] , such as the following.
In key stealing attacks, seized agents steal path keys they mediate [4, 5, 17, 19] . In Fig. 4a , agent a 3 is seized, and steals the path keys it mediates. a 2 is also seized, and can steal keys if used as agent. Keys mediated by a 1 are safe until it is seized. Data injection is a different attack, but also well-recognized [6, 20] .
Redundancy can mitigate key stealing. A group pair G u , G v may have t agent pairs, each defining a keypath (Fig. 1a) . A keypath is seized iff an agent within it is seized. Two sensors s i ∈ G u and s j ∈ G v can select any one of these t keypaths for key establishment, with probability 1 t . An adversary who seizes c keypaths can seize this keypath with probability c t . He succeeds with high probability only for high c, giving some protection against stealing.
Key Foisting: A Serious New Attack
Unfortunately, the literature has not recognized that fraudulent path keys can be forced on victims by faked path-key establishment requests from seized agents. Such key foisting (KF) may be seen as an impersonationand-key-injection attack. Injection has been studied for fake data [6, 20] , but not path keys. Superficially similar, Sybil attacks [9, 18] overwhelm reputation systems with fake identities.
The KF attack works as follows. Let K sxsy denote the preloaded key shared by some two nodes s x and s y . Fig. 4b , agent a 2 is seized, and sends fake path-key establishment requests to all sensor pairs it serves. This attack succeeds because authentication is hop-by-hop, not end-to-end.
Seize s
Key foisting is feasible whenever path keys are established [4, 17] , not just in group-based methods. Our analysis shows that current schemes are all vulnerable.
Foisting When Public Keys are Used
KF can be addressed if PKI is available, since sensors can verify public-key certificates. However, as we have noted, this assumption is not realistic in very large and heterogeneous networks. KF is possible in public cryptography based key establishment schemes like PGP, when no certification authority is available. Let Alice and Bob have public keys P A and P B , and Carol have secret key S C . Alice and Bob both trust Carol. They both know Carol's public key, but not each other's public key. The adversary compromises the secure channel between Alice and Bob as follows:
1. Seize Carol and her secret key S C .
Fabricate two public keys P *
A and P * B . 3. Claim that Alice wishes to establish a secure channel with Bob, and send the message ⟨(P 4.1 mGKE mGKE preloads a unique key into each pair of sensors in the same group, so its intra-group resilience is perfect. In addition, t sensors pairs from G u × G v are preloaded with unique pairwise keys. Other sensors pairs use these agents to establish path keys (Fig. 1a) . Each group contains n s sensors, and there are n g groups in the network. Agents in G u for G v are selected using the formula
where 
Two-Way Key Establishment (2W)
We propose two-way key establishment (2W) to deal with key foisting. All schemes to date have used oneway key establishment (1W).
In the 1W scheme, let 
Reverse Phase of 2W Key Establishment:
As shown in Fig. 1a To establish a path key with b 2 , sensor a 3 picks a random value K → a3b2 , and proceeds as follows (message headers are omitted for simplicity).
A great strength of a scheme like mGKE is its support for multipath reinforcement. mGKE with our 2W scheme defeats foisting. However, as Theorem 1 shows, key stealing is always possible. Using k-path reinforcement [5] also adds resilience against key stealing. We will find k-path reinforcement useful in increasing resilience to a mixed attack described in Section 7.
In k-path reinforcement [5] , a key is cryptographically divided into shares, and sent along k node-disjoint paths to the destination, where it is reconstituted from the shares. The adversary must compromise all k of these paths to steal the key.
Using k-PR in mGKE is much more efficient than in other schemes. Randomized methods like RKP [5] only make probabilistic guarantees about network connectivity, without assuring that node degrees are at least k. Nodes of lower degree cannot use k-path key reinforcement. Even when k disjoint paths exist, they are expensive to find.
In contrast, k-PR works well in mGKE, where keypaths are all agent-disjoint (Fig. 1a) , so it suffices to pick any k keypaths. In mGKE, keypaths have two or fewer agents, but paths in [5] may have any number of them. Agents encrypt/decrypt messages, so k-PR security drops as the number of agents per path grows in [5] . Finally, mGKE initiators can find agents from Eqn. (1), and send path key messages via standard routing, but initiators in [5] must themselves discover paths and select agents from them. Even worse, [15] uses broadcasting and flooding to find agents. Group-based schemes like mGKE have several desirable properties:
• k ≤ t agent-disjoint keypaths exist between any two nodes, as t exist between any two groups.
• s i ∈ G u gets k agent-disjoint keypaths to s j ∈ G v just by selecting k agents from the t agents in A uv .
• Intra-group communication overhead is far smaller than inter-group communication overhead [19] .
In Sec. 7.2, we show how to use aggregation with k-PR to greatly reduce the communication overhead.
HRW BASED PATH KEY ESTABLISHMENT
In this section, we first briefly introduce highest random weight (HRW), then present HRW based multipath key reinforcement ((k, I)-HPR).
Highest Random Weight
The Highest Random Weight algorithm was introduced in [23] to achieve distributed consensus on objectserver mappings. It uses a hash function h : {0, 1} * → Z p as follows. Given an object name o i and N servers S = {α 1 , . . . , α N }, HRW first computes h(o i ∥α 1 ), . . .,  h(o i ∥α N ) where ∥ means concatenation, and selects n ≤ N servers α i1 , . . . , α in ⊆ S having the highest hash values to serve the object.
HRW ensures that each server set is selected to serve a given object with the same probability. Each object is always mapped to the same server set, and this mapping can be computed locally by each client. Most importantly, HRW minimizes disruption in the event of server failure. If a single server is to be chosen, we set n = 1.
Highest Random Weight based path key establishment
We state how to use HRW in path key establishment. Let the s i ∈ G u denote the initiator and s j ∈ G v denote the recipient. Let {(a HRW based path key establishment can improve the resilience against KF. Unless the adversary seizes the k agent pairs with the highest random values, K sisj is safe since s j will reject K sisj not sent by these k agent pairs. Meanwhile, its communication overhead is just half of that of 2W k-PR.
Fault Tolerant
Agents may not always be available due to physical damage or power outage. We use (k, I) secret sharing scheme in path key establishment to mitigate the affection of faulty agents. In (k, I) secret sharing, a secret is divided into I pieces, and can be recovered by any k in I pieces. In path key establishment, I agent pairs with the highest hash values are selected to establish 
ANALYSIS OF RESILIENCE
We now show how devastating the KF attack is by analyzing the resilience of mGKE with 1W against KF. When a node is seized, all its keys are lost. Since it may have mediated path keys, keys for unseized nodes may be affected. The resilience of a path key scheme is hence judged [19] by the rate at which keys (or keypaths) between unseized sensors are lost, as sensors are seized.
Let mGKE (1W k-PR) denote mGKE using 1W path key establishment and k-path key reinforcement, and mGKE (2W k-PR) denote mGKE using 2W path key establishment and k-path key reinforcement. In mGKE (2W k-PR), k keypaths are used by both the initiator and the recipient, so that 2k keypaths are used in all for path key establishment. In k-path reinforcement [5] , a path key is divided into k shares. The initiator sends the k shares via k agent-disjoint keypaths. To steal the path key, the adversary must now seize an agent in each path. k-path key reinforcement improves resilience at the cost of communication overhead.
To compare the resilience against KF and KS, we first analyze the resilience of mGKE (1W k-PR) against both attacks. We will show that the resilience against KF is very much poorer than the resilience against KS.
Three cases arise when K sisj is a path key for 
where
Each group pair has t agent pairs, and n 2 s − t path keys. Of these, (n s −t) 2 
For type-1 path keys, if b ≤ k − 1, the adversary can steal no keypaths. If b ≥ 2t − 1, all keypaths are stolen. Define the ranges
, and
In Eqn. (5),
is the probability that the kkeypath used by s i and s j is seized, when l keypaths are seized.
(
2l−b is the probability that l keypaths are seized, when b agents are seized. Eqns. (3) (4) (5) give the probabilities Eqn. (2) needs for type-1 path keys. Analysis for type-2 and type-3 keys is similar. Our analysis matches simulation, and resilience is excellent (Fig. 6 ). We simulate a sensor network with 10000 nodes under the mGKE (1W k-PR) scheme. Let c denote the number seized sensors, N c denote the total number of path keys of n − c unseized sensors and N f c denote the number of compromised path key when c sensors are seized. We use the ratio
Nc as the probability of successful key stealing for various c. All simulations in this paper were conducted in this manner. With even 20% sensors seized, the chances that a given pathkey is stolen are under 5% for 3-PR, and under 1% for 5-PR. We see that k-path key reinforcement is very effective in dealing with KS. k-PR enhances the resilience to KS for methods other than mGKE as well [19, 4, 17] . However, we will now show that no 1W scheme can resist KF, despite the use of k-PR.
mGKE (1W k-PR) Key-Foisting Resilience
We now present the first-ever analysis of foisting. We show that all 1W schemes [19, 4, 17] perform poorly against KF.
For type-1 path keys,
In Eqns. (6, 7), all keypaths are secure when b ≤ k − 1. Otherwise, we can choose l agent pairs from 2t agents in 2
is missing because all path keys can be foisted with any k keypaths seized.
We now have the probabilities needed in Eqn. (2) . Eqns. (6) yield P K|b , and Eqns. (3), (4) yield P q and P b|c . Fig. 7 shows the probability that a given path key in mGKE (1W) has in fact been foisted, as per Eqns. (6-7) and simulation, for k = 1, 10, 20. Our analysis matches simulations perfectly. Comparing the resilience shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , it is clear that KF is much more devastating than KS and simply using multipath reinforcement cannot improve the resilience much.
An analysis of PIKE, GP to stealing is given in [19] , but no analysis for foisting has appeared. Fig. 8 shows our simulation results of foisting resilience for PIKE-2D and GP (unique pairwise keys), with n g = n s = 100, t = 10. PIKE's good showing is meaningless, given its poor resilience to stealing [19] . GP performs the worst, as its groups share too many agents.
mGKE (2W 1-PR) Resilience to Foisting
We analyze mGKE (2W 1-PR) performance, based on mGKE (1W). The following simple lemma is useful.
Lemma 1. A keypath between G u and G v is compromised either in both directions, or not at all.
Proof: A keypath is compromised iff one or more agents in it are. Agents are indifferent to message direction.
We next show that mGKE (2W 1-PR) is immune to foisting.
Theorem 2. mGKE (2W k-PR) is immune to key foisting if k > 0, no matter how many nodes are seized.
Proof: We assume that the adversary has knowledge of data local to any node if and only if he has seized the node. We yield him the maximum advantage, setting k = 1. Now, let him seize all sensors in G u and G v except s i , s j .
Assume the adversary foists a key K * sisj on s i and s j , so that neither s i nor s j functioned as initiator. By the 2W algorithm (Sec. 4.2), s i must have received a share f * i from the adversary, generated a random g i , and computed a key locally as 
However, g i and g j were randomly generated local values, which he can access only if he controls both s i and s j . This contradicts our assumption that he controls neither.
To make mGKE immune to KF, it suffices to use 2W path key establishment. Multipath key reinforcement is not required to guard against foisting. Other schemes, such as PIKE and GP can also adopt the 2W path key establishment to guard against KF.
REPLAYS, KEY FOISTING, AND MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS
Current 1W schemes do not guarantee message freshness, and are vulnerable to replays. Let a path key K sisj established at time t 1 over k keypaths be compromised at time t 2 > t 1 . In a 1W scheme, recording the intergroup path-key establishment messages at time t 1 allows the adversary to replay them at time t 3 ≥ t 2 , and foist K sisj on s j .
Theorem 3. mGKE (2W) is immune to replays.
Proof: Exactly as for Theorem 2.
Keys cannot be directly foisted in 2W schemes since the adversary cannot control the key half generated by receiver s j . KS attacks remain viable (see Theorem 1), as is the following hybrid attack, when a very large number of nodes are compromised. mGKE (2W k-PR) continues to show excellent resilience.
Hybrid (KF-KS) Attacks
The adversary can combine KF with KS to compromise security, by creating separate keys with a pair of sensors and interposing himself in between. He must control enough agents in each group to control all key paths with high probability. We will show that KF-KS is no worse for mGKE (2W k-PR) than simple KS.
In Fig. 9 , the adversary has seized agents a 2 , a 3 ∈ G u , b 1 ∈ G v , and attacks s i ∈ G u and s j ∈ G v as follows. We will now show that KF-KS is no more effective against mGKE (2W k-PR) than a simple KS attack.
Fabricate a forward half
In mGKE (2W k-PR), k keypaths are used by both the initiator and the recipient, so that 2k keypaths are used in all. With l keypaths seized, the chances that all shares of r i and r j are stolen are
. Let M denote success of a KF-KS attack. For type-1 keys,
Analysis of type-2 and 3 keys is similar. We get the resilience by using P M |b in Eqn. (8) to replace P K|b in Equation 2. Fig. 10 shows mGKE (2W k-PR)'s excellent resilience to KF-KS attacks, which succeed less than 12% of the time even with k = 1 and 20% of the sensors seized. mGKE (2W k-PR) has nearly perfect resilience against KF-KS even with k ≥ 3 and 20% of sensors seized. It outperforms the original multipath reinforcement significantly (Fig. 7, 8) . KF-KS is no more effective than KS (Fig. 6 ). Fig. 11 shows the resilience of mGKE (2W k-PR) against KF-KS in different settings of t and k.
Aggregation to Reduce k-PR Overhead
As shown in Fig. 10 , the resilience of mGKE (2W 1-PR) against KF-KS is excellent. However, we can use k-PR to improve the resilience if a higher standard of security is required, say, that KF-KS succeed less than 5% of the time with 20% sensors seized.
Unfortunately, the default implementation of k-PR incurs k times the communication overhead of 1-PR. We now present k-PR with Aggregation, which makes k-PR efficient in mGKE. We can drop the KF-KS 's success rate below 1% in mGKE, at little or no additional cost, by choosing k ≥ 3.
In k-PR with aggregation, instead of sending each share from G u to G v as a separate inter-group message, we collect all shares at one agent in G u , and send them to G v in one inter-group message (Fig. 12b) .
s i ∈ G u finds the agent set A uv for G v via Eqn.
(1) and selects k agents {a 
, re-encrypting it to get I 1 . It now sends the following message to a 
Energy Savings of k-PR with Aggregation
Consider a D×D region with n g groups. A group has extent d×d,
ng . The average distance between two random points in a unit square [13] is about 0.52, so the average distance between two sensors in the network is δ ≈ 0.52D, and δ uu ≈ 0.52d if they are both in G u . Let δ uv be the average distance between a sensor in G u and one in G v . Let p uu be the probability that two randomly chosen sensors are in the same group, and p uv be the probability that they are not. Clearly, 0.52D =
Let the expected number of hops to transmit a message a unit distance be γ. The expected hop count between two sensors is h u = δuu γ if they are in the same group and h uv = δuv γ otherwise. Let e(L) be the expected energy consumed per hop to send and receive a packet of length L. A length-L message from s i ∈ G u to s j ∈ G v , involves two intra-group messages and one inter-group message, and consumes energy e(L)(2h u + h uv ). The expected energy consumed in establishing a path key between s i and s j in the 2W and 2WA schemes is
Substituting for h u , h uv , δ u , δ uv , and d, we have
g − 3k) (11) Each message in the 2W scheme contains a share, two sensor IDs and a group id, so that L ≤ 30 bytes, and kL ≤ 300 bytes even for k = 10. We know
e(kL) ≈ 1 when kL ≤ 300 bytes [21] . If n g = 100,
The E 2WA /E 2W ratio is 0.58 for k = 2, and 0.33 for k = 5. Aggregation is clearly effective. Surprisingly, 2WA can be more efficient than the very insecure 1W schemes. Since E 2W /E 1W = 2, the E 2WA /E 1W ratio is 1.16 for k = 2, and 0.66 for k = 5. Our 2WA method provides both strong security and efficiency at the same time.
RESILIENCE OF HPR
In this section, we give the formal analysis of the resilience of (k, I)-HPR against KF. KF-KS does not work here since there is no reverse phase in (k, I)-HPR.
Resilience against KF
We use mGKE as the key predistribution scheme, and use (k, I)-HPR as the path key establishment scheme. We analyze the probability that a path key K ij of two sensors s i ∈ G u , s j ∈ G v is compromised by KF attack when c sensors are captured and f sensors are faulty in the network.
We first derive the probability that K sisj is compromised in (k, I)-HPR. For simplicity, we only consider type-1 path keys. Let K s i s j be the event that K sisj is compromised, c ⟨ij⟩ be the event that c nodes are seized in all, but neither s i nor s j is. Let l c be the event that l c agent pairs are captured between G u and G v . Let b be the event that b in 2t agents are captured between G u and G v . The probability that K sisj is compromised when c sensors are captured is:
We derive each term in Formula 14. When (k, I)-HPR is used, the probability that K ij is compromised when l c agent pairs are seized between G u and G v is
For the second term in Formula 14, we have
The third term in Formula 14, we have
Fig . 13 shows the resilience of (k, I)-HPR against KF. From Fig. 13a and Fig 13b, we can see that the resilience is reduced by increasing I as we expect. In Fig. 13a, 13c and 13d, we set I to half of t. We can see that by increasing t and k, the resilience is also improved. We can see the resilience of (k, I)-HPR is comparable to 2W k-PR, and the communication overhead of (k, I)-HPR is smaller than 2W k-PR. KF can only compromise less than 1% path keys by carefully selecting proper t, k and I when 20% sensors are seized.
Resilience against Faulty Sensors
Now we begin to analyze the affection of faulty sensors to the path key establishment. We try to derive the probability that s i and s j cannot establish a path key when f sensors are faulty in the network.
Faulty sensors can affect path key establishment since although we loose the threshold for agent pair selection from top k agent pairs to any k agent pairs in top I agent pairs, it is still possible that more than I − k + 1 agent pairs are faulty in the top I agent pairs.
Let K ij denote the event that s i and s j cannot establish path keys because of faulty sensors. Let f ⟨ij⟩ be the event that f nodes are faulty in all, but neither s i nor s j is. Let l f be the event that l f agent pairs are faulty between G u and G v . Let b f be the event that b f in 2t agents are faulty between G u and G v . We have
The first term in Formula 19 is
The third term in Formula 19 is
Fig. 14 shows the resilience of (k, I)-HPR against faulty sensors. From Fig. 14a and Fig 14b, we can see that the resilience is improved by increasing I. In Fig.  14a, 14c and 14d, we set I to half of t. We can see that by increasing t and k, the resilience is also improved. when 20% sensors are faulty, only less than 1% path key establishments are affected by carefully selecting proper t, k and I. From these figures, we can see that with I increasing, our scheme has better resilience against faulty sensors. However, larger I means worse resilience against KF, which is not what we want.
KEY FOISTING IN THE GENERAL MODEL
We describe how to perform KF in general distributed systems. In a distributed system containing n nodes {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n }, the n nodes form a network, and can send messages to other nodes. There is also an adversary with the ability of eavesdropping messages transmitted between any two nodes. We assume that no central authority is available, but some node pairs have pre-defined cryptographic channels to protect communication security, and other node pairs can only use the pre-defined cryptographic channels to establish new cryptographic channels. Without lose of generality, we assume that these cryptographic channels are protected by secrets used in message encryption and decryption. We do not restrict secrets must be symmetric keys here. We analyze the probability that a path secret K sisj of two nodes s i s j is compromised by KF attack when l c in t cryptographic paths are compromised by the adversary. We have
In Formula. 23, when the adversary compromises fewer than k cryptographic paths, he cannot compromise K sisj . When the adversary compromises k ≤ l c < t − I + k cryptographic paths, he has the probability
to have s i accept his K sisj , and he has the same probability to have s j accepts the secret. When the adversary compromises more than t−I +k paths, he will have both s i , s j accepts his K sisj with probability 1.
CONCLUSION
We have described key foisting, a new attack on sensor systems that has not so far been recognized in the literature, and showed how current schemes fail catastrophically against it. We then presented two-way key establishment and HRW based key establishment which are practical in mGKE, and confer excellent resilience against foisting and related attacks, including man-inthe-middle attacks. We provided a detailed analysis of these attacks, and verified the accuracy of our analysis with detailed simulations. Our analysis and simulations confirm that mGKE (2W) has excellent resilience against both key stealing and foisting attacks. The twoway scheme and (k, I)-HPR have very low overhead compared even with the insecure one-way scheme. Our future work will include reducing the overheads even further, and implementing these schemes on real sensor networks. 
